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The Recession of 2001 
and Unemployment 
Insurance Financing
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
y the standard macroeconomic yardstick—the change in
 real GDP—the economic downturn of 2001 was one of the 
mildest of the past fifty years. Yet during 2002-04, several large 
states experienced difficulties financing their unemployment 
insurance (UI) programs. To date, nine state UI programs have 
secured loans to pay UI benefits. In addition to borrowing 
from the U.S. Treasury, the traditional source for loans, UI 
programs have borrowed from the private bond market and, 
in the case of Pennsylvania, from another agency of state 
government.
Through the end of 2004, the U.S. labor market continued 
to exhibit softness, with unemployment in December totaling 
8 million. Despite gains in employment, particularly during the 
second half of the year, the unemployment rate in 2004 
averaged 5.5 percent and the seasonally adjusted rate did not 
descend below 5.4 percent in any month. Should the economic 
recovery stall or suffer a reverse, it is likely that some UI 
programs would have to borrow in 2005. From the perspectives 
of the labor market and UI program financing, the recession 
was more serious than one would infer simply from following 
the evolution of real GDP between 2001 and 2004.
This paper examines the recent recession, with particular 
attention given to developments in the labor market and in UI 
program financing. Its three objectives are to describe 
developments in the macroeconomy and in the labor market 
that have relevance for UI funding issues, to present the 
important developments in UI financing associated with the 
2001 recession (because primary responsibility for ensuring UI 
trust fund adequacy resides with the states, the discussion 
highlights developments in several states), and to discuss the 
borrowing options available to states whose trust fund reserves 
are inadequate. The pros and cons of alternative borrowing 
arrangements are also noted. The discussion identifies options 
but does not recommend a “preferred” method of borrowing. 
In choosing its financing strategy, a state must consider factors 
such as constitutional constraints, federal loan requirements, 
the size of the funding problem, interest rates on alternative 
debt instruments, and the terms and conditions of debt 
repayment. Finally, the paper summarizes the experiences of 
state UI programs that borrowed and repaid loans from the 
private bond market during earlier recessions.
State UI programs function as a built-in or automatic 
stabilizer of the macroeconomy, with benefits payouts rising 
sharply during recessions. The pattern of recession-related 
benefits payments also reflects developments specific to each 
individual recession. Accordingly, we begin with a review of the 
2001 downturn and recovery, to provide key background 
information for understanding recent UI funding experiences.
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Chart 1
Quarterly Indexes of Real Output
and the Employment Rate
2000:1 to 2004:4
Index: 2000
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce (real GDP); U.S. Department 
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (employment rate).
Notes: The employment rate is 100 minus the unemployment rate. 
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2. The Recession of 2001
The economic downturn of 2001 was mild—so mild, in fact, that 
its dating was not finally established until more than one year 
after its trough. In most post–World War II recessions, the 
quarterly decrease in real GDP was roughly 1 to 3 percent for one 
or two quarters, followed by a rebound in which real GDP 
growth often exceeded 4 percent for one or two quarters. During 
earlier episodes, changes in the unemployment rate occurred at 
nearly the same time as the changes in real GDP. For the eight 
recessions between 1949 and 1982, the month of highest 
unemployment occurred within four months of the month 
deemed to have been the trough by the experts at the National 
Bureau of Economic Research who officially date U.S. recessions.
The recessions of the early 1990s and of 2001 differed in 
important respects from the earlier downturns. The decrease in 
real GDP has been smaller and the rebound in real GDP has 
been more modest. Probably most relevant for the present 
discussion, the time interval between the business cycle trough 
and the peak in unemployment has lengthened. The official 
cyclical trough for the recession of the early 1990s was 
March 1991, but the highest unemployment rate occurred 
in June 1992, fifteen months later. The corresponding dates 
for the 2001 recession were November 2001 for the official 
cyclical trough and June 2003 for the peak unemployment rate, 
an interval of nineteen months.
During the recovery from the 2001 recession, labor 
productivity growth has been rapid, allowing output increases 
to be achieved with little increase in employment. The result 
has been a long period of sticky unemployment rates. After 
averaging 4.0 percent in 2000, the monthly unemployment rate 
increased steadily during 2001, reaching 5.7 percent in 
December. The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate has 
equaled or exceeded 5.4 percent in every month between 
November 2001 and December 2004.
Chart 1 summarizes quarterly macroeconomic 
developments from 2000 through 2004:4. Real GDP and the 
employment rate (100 minus the unemployment rate) have 
both been indexed at 100 for 2000 and then traced through the 
recession and recovery. The real output path in 2001 is 
remarkably flat and then increases at a modest pace during 
2002 and the first two quarters of 2003. The acceleration in real 
GDP growth during the last half of 2003 and continuing into 
2004 is apparent from the chart.
The employment rate in Chart 1 declined during 2001 and 
then was remarkably flat in the twelve quarters of 2002-04. In 
every month between November 2001 and December 2004, the 
absolute level of unemployment was 8 million or higher. The 
8-million threshold is evident in Chart 2.
We note that the peak unemployment rate following the 
recession of 2001, 6.3 percent in June 2003, was not high by 
historic standards. During the four preceding recessions, the 
peak unemployment rate exceeded 7.5 percent, and for two 
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Chart 3
Temporary-Layoff and Other Job-Loser Shares
of Unemployment
1967 to 2004
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Notes: The chart shows the proportions of total unemployment. Other
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or higher. What is unusual about the 2001 recession is the long 
duration of the spells experienced by the unemployed. Mean 
and median durations in 2003 and 2004 were higher than their 
counterparts in the early 1990s recession and were at roughly 
the same levels as those in the major back-to-back recessions of 
the early 1980s.
To illustrate the unusually long unemployment durations of 
the recent recession, we examine annual averages from the 
monthly labor force survey for all ten post–World War II 
recessions. Mean duration was noted from 1949 to 2004 and 
median duration from 1967 (the earliest available year) to 
2004. The means for 2003 and 2004 (19.2 and 19.6 weeks, 
respectively) were exceeded only by the mean of 20.0 weeks in 
1983. Similarly, the medians for 2003 and 2004 (10.1 and 9.8 
weeks, respectively) were the highest ever, except for the 
median of 10.1 weeks of 1983. Both sets of 2003-04 two-year 
averages were higher than the two-year averages from any 
previous recession.
Contributing to this high unemployment duration has been 
a high rate of permanent job separations. Using annual data 
from 1967 to 2004, Chart 3 displays two series showing persons 
on temporary layoff and other job-losers as a proportion of 
total unemployment. Other job-losers are persons who have 
been terminated by their employers without a definite recall 
date, and, since 1994, persons whose temporary job 
assignments have ended. All have little or no prospect of 
returning to work with their former employers. In contrast, 
most on temporary layoff will be recalled within thirty days.
Average unemployment durations for the two groups 
differ sharply. In 2004, for example, only 6.2 percent of those 
on temporary layoff experienced an unemployment duration 
of twenty-seven or more weeks, compared with 28.0 percent 
for other job-losers. Nearly all of the latter group must find 
work with a different employer. Securing work with a new 
employer presents challenges for many, but it was especially 
difficult during 2002-04, when employment growth was 
very low.
The x-axis of Chart 3 identifies the trough years for the six 
recessions since 1967, years when data on reasons for 
unemployment are available. For the first four (1970, 1975, 
1980, and 1982), note how the temporary-layoff proportion 
increased in the trough year and the other job-loser share 
increased one and two years following the trough year. 
During the recessions of 1990 and 2001, the pattern of 
increase among other job-losers closely resembles that of the 
earlier recessions (with perhaps a larger increase)—that is, 
highest one and two years after the trough year. However, 
note how little the temporary-layoff proportion increased in 
1990 and 2001. In these two recessions, employers relied 
more immediately on permanent separations to make 
employment adjustments. This increased reliance on 
permanent separations helps explain the long average 
unemployment durations of 2003 and 2004.
This recent period of high unemployment has also seen 
persistently high claims for regular unemployment insurance 
program benefits.1 Chart 2 shows that as unemployment 
increased during 2001, the number of claimants increased from 
about 2.2 million and reached 3.0 million by mid-year. The 
number then remained above 3.0 million through March 2004. 
For the July 2001-December 2004 period, the monthly average 
exceeded 3.3 million. Two features of UI claims during 2002-04 
have been the long average duration of claims and the high rate 
of exhaustion of benefits. UI claimants have faced greater 
difficulties in securing new jobs than they have in several 
previous recessions even though average 2002-04 unemploy-
ment rates were low compared with those of earlier recessions.
 Experiencing a long period of high claims volume means 
that states were faced with high UI benefits costs even though 
real GDP was increasing. This again illustrates the fact that 
during the recovery from the 2001 recession, the labor market 
and the product market have not behaved identically. In 2002 
and 2003, regular UI programs paid about $40 billion in 
benefits per year, or twice the annual payments in 1999 and 
2000. Even in 2004, payouts totaled about $35 billion. While 
the cost rates (benefits as a percentage of covered payroll) for 
the regular UI program during 2002-04 were not unusually 
high by historic standards, the long interval of high claims 
volume has caused major drawdowns in state UI trust funds.64 The Recession of 2001 and Unemployment Insurance Financing
Chart 4
Aggregate Unemployment Insurance Reserve Ratio
1960 to 2004
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Workforce Security.
Note: The chart shows the reserve ratio minus net reserves as a
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Chart 4 also presents the volume of claimants under the 
emergency federal benefits program known as Temporary 
Extended Unemployment Compensation (TEUC). Claims 
were highest during April-June 2002 (more than 1.3 million 
per month), immediately after the program began in mid-
March. The high initial caseload included many who had 
exhausted regular UI well before the start of TEUC. Following 
this initial bulge, the numbers averaged nearly 0.9 million or 
roughly 20 percent of the combined (regular plus TEUC) UI 
claims load between July 2002 and December 2003. TEUC paid 
about $10 billion in both 2002 and 2003. Because TEUC was 
fully federally financed, it does not enter our discussion, which 
focuses on state UI financing experiences.
3. Aggregate UI Trust Fund Balances
The long period of high regular UI claims has substantially 
reduced state unemployment insurance trust fund balances. 
Total net reserves across the fifty-three programs (the fifty 
states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the 
Virgin Islands) decreased from $54.1 billion at the end of 2000 
to $20.0 to $21.0 billion at the end of both 2003 and 2004.2
Chart 4 traces developments in aggregate UI trust fund 
balances from 1960 to 2004. Since absolute balances do not 
incorporate growth in the scale of the economy, reserves are 
more accurately tracked by measuring them relative to annual 
UI covered wages, termed a reserve ratio. The design of UI 
financing arrangements anticipates that trust funds will be 
drawn down during recessions and replenished during 
recoveries. Chart 4 identifies five recessionary periods with 
major trust fund reductions,3 with the largest changes 
occurring during 1974-76 and 1980-83. Compared with these 
earlier periods, the drawdowns during 1991-92 and 2001-03 
were more modest.
Using reserve ratios as an indicator of UI trust fund health, 
we observe how the ratios fall neatly into two broad time 
periods. Prior to 1975, all reserve ratios exceeded 2 percent, but 
after 1975 no ratio exceeded 2 percent. There has been a long-
run trend toward smaller balances when reserves are measured 
relative to an economywide aggregate like total covered 
payroll.4
Note the very low reserve ratios during 1975-76 and during 
1982-83 when the overall ratio was actually negative. These two 
periods were characterized by large-scale borrowing by the 
states to pay benefits and by substantial adjustments in UI 
benefits and taxes to improve program solvency. Twenty-five 
state UI programs borrowed during 1975-76 while thirty-two 
borrowed during 1980-83. Despite present difficulties in many 
states, the current funding situation is much better than it was 
during these earlier periods.
Chart 4 traces the increases in reserve ratios during four 
periods of economic expansion: 1961-69, 1977-79, 1983-89, 
and 1993-2000. Note the large increases in the reserve ratio 
between 1984 and 1989—years of strong economic growth. 
Additionally, because more than half the states had required 
loans from the U.S. Treasury during 1980-83, there was strong 
motivation to restore trust fund balances to higher levels. 
Sustained reserve accumulations were widespread, and the 
aggregate reserve ratio increased from -0.47 percent at the end 
of 1983 to about 1.90 percent at the end of 1989 and 1990. This 
was the largest sustained accumulation of reserves for the four 
recovery periods depicted in Chart 3.
The rapid pace of trust fund building during 1983-89 stands 
in sharp contrast to the experiences of the 1990s. Note that the 
reserve ratio only increased from 1.25 percent at the end of 
1992 and 1993 to about 1.50 percent at the end of the decade. 
The failure of aggregate reserves to grow more rapidly during 
these years reflects the cumulative effects in several states of UI 
tax reductions and slow growth in taxable wages caused by 
limits on taxable wages per covered worker. Thus, entering the 
2001 recession, aggregate trust fund reserves were less adequate 
than they were just before the 1990-91 recession. In fact, the 
prerecession reserve ratio of 1.46 percent in December 2000 
was lower than it was in all recessions back to 1949, with the 
sole exception of 1979. The $54.1 billion in the state UI trust 
funds at the end of 2000 simply was not that large when 
measured relative to the overall scale of the U.S. economy.5
It should be noted that the fund balances underlying Chart 4 
include the $8 billion distributed to the states in March 2002 
under provisions of the Reed Act. Absent this distribution, 
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been lower, for example, 0.31 to 0.33 percent in 2003 and 2004 
rather than 0.53 to 0.55 percent, as shown in Chart 4. This 
$8 billion infusion prevented larger drawdowns of reserves and 
helped the financing situation of many states.
The Reed Act distribution of 2002 also gave states increased 
flexibility in the use of UI trust fund moneys. Tax receipts 
deposited into state UI trust funds can be used for only a single 
purpose: to pay UI benefits. Reed Act deposits, in contrast, can 
be used to finance UI administration and/or worker adjust-
ment programs as well as to pay benefits. Several states have 
used their Reed Act moneys to support such activities.
4. Trust Fund Balances 
in Individual States
The standard measure of trust fund adequacy for an 
unemployment insurance program is the reserve ratio (or high-
cost) multiple. This is a ratio measure that recognizes three 
factors: the trust fund balance at a point in time, annual covered 
payroll, and the highest cost rate experienced by the state in the 
past. The numerator of this ratio is the reserve ratio (the trust 
fund balance as a percentage of payroll), exactly analogous to 
the national reserve ratio series displayed in Chart 4. The 
denominator is the highest previous twelve-month cost rate 
(benefits as a percentage of payroll). Most who study trust fund 
reserve adequacy recommend that a state achieve a prerecession 
reserve ratio multiple of at least 1.0, or sometimes 1.5. Having a 
multiple of 1.0 means that the trust fund can support twelve 
months of payouts at the historically highest payout rate.
In practice, many individual states have fallen short of 
achieving this solvency standard. At the end of 2000, the 
national reserve ratio multiple was only 0.66,6 and just eleven 
states had multiples that exceeded 1.0. By the end of 2003 and 
2004, the national reserve ratio multiple had decreased to 0.24-
0.25, or by about 0.41. During the recession, as in past 
recessions, the UI program has performed a stabilizing 
function for the macroeconomy by having much larger benefits 
payouts than tax collections. The expectation is that the 
drawdown will be reversed in the ensuing recovery as tax 
revenues will increase through experience rating, exceed 
benefits payouts, and replenish the state trust funds.7
Having a low reserve ratio multiple prior to a recession 
means that a state will have less time to make solvency 
adjustments if it wants to avoid exhausting its trust fund. 
Although a well-established borrowing mechanism exists, 
states prefer to avoid borrowing if possible. In the past, 
especially during 1975-77 and again during 1980-83, 
widespread and large-scale borrowing occurred. States with 
low and negative UI reserves then responded with legislation 
to raise UI taxes and reduce benefits. Part of the tax response 
occurs automatically through experience rating, but the states 
also made other adjustments to taxes and benefits to improve 
solvency.8
The recession of 2001 affected nearly all states by lowering 
employment and increasing unemployment. When we 
compare state unemployment rates for 2000 and 2003, we see 
that all states had higher unemployment in 2003 except Hawaii 
(no change) and Montana (lower by 0.3 percentage point). 
Across all fifty-three “state” UI programs, only three 
experienced increases in their reserve ratio multiples between 
December 2000 and December 2003 (Hawaii, Maine, and 
North Dakota) while fifty experienced reductions.
Seventeen states entered the 2001 recession with reserve 
ratio multiples lower than 0.60. Between the end of 2000 and 
the end of 2003, almost exactly half (eight) of the seventeen 
states experienced above-average reductions in their reserve 
ratio multiples. Many of the states with low prerecession 
reserve ratio multiples have had to borrow to make benefits 
payments. Thus, low initial reserves and above-average 
reductions in reserves contributed to the UI funding problems 
in individual states.
Table 1 provides descriptive details for fifteen states with 
low reserve ratio multiples, all below 0.25, at the end of 2003. 
The states are divided into two groups: nine that had under-
taken some form of borrowing during 2002-04 (panel A) and 
six that had low reserves but no borrowing through the end of 
2004 (panel B). 
Note the large size of the states in Table 1 (column 1).9 
Panel A contains four of the five largest states and eight of the 
largest fifteen. Combined, the two panels include eleven of the 
fifteen largest states. In fact, just one of the fifteen states, 
Arkansas, is below average in size.10 Using the prerecession 
reserve ratio multiple as an indicator of prudent UI trust fund 
management, we see that the large states, on average, have been 
less prudent managers than the small states. The simple 
(unweighted) average reserve ratio multiple for the thirteen 
largest states at the end of 2000, based on total payroll, was 0.54 
(roughly half of the recommended standard), compared with 
0.98 for the thirteen smallest states.
Columns 2-4 of Table 1 focus on losses of reserves during 
2001-03. Reserves are measured on a net basis, such that 
outstanding loans are subtracted from the gross balances held 
in the state accounts at the U.S. Treasury.11 For the same three-
year period, the national multiple decreased by 0.41. Among 
the nine states in panel A, only New York experienced a below-
average decrease in its reserve ratio multiple. Note in panel B 
that Colorado and Virginia experienced very large losses in 
reserves during 2001-03.1266 The Recession of 2001 and Unemployment Insurance Financing
Column 5 of Table 1 identifies the time of each state’s first 
borrowing, while columns 6 and 7 present each state’s level of 
indebtedness at the end of 2003 and 2004, respectively. The 
total for six states was $3.2 billion in both years. Borrowing is 
seasonal, being especially large during January-March, as 
payouts are high while tax receipts are low. This borrowing, 
termed cash-flow loans, is often followed by repayments that 
occur after first-quarter taxes are received. For example, total 
state UI indebtedness to the U.S. Treasury from all borrowing 
at the end of March 2004 was $5.6 billion, but it was only 
$3.6 billion at the end of June 2004.
California, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania first borrowed 
in 2004. Pennsylvania’s borrowing was from another state 
fund, the Motor License Fund. This was effectively a cash-flow 
loan to cover a potential revenue shortfall in the months just 
prior to the large seasonal revenue inflow of April-May. A loan 
of $300 million was secured in March and was fully repaid in 
May. Borrowing by California ($238 million) and 
Massachusetts ($418 million) was also fully repaid by the end 
of May 2004. One or more of these three states may have to 
borrow again during the early months of 2005.
Most states faced with declining trust fund reserves would 
follow one of two courses of action. A state can try to “ride it 
out,” hoping that the economic recovery will improve revenues 
and reduce benefit outlays sufficiently for the trust fund to 
bottom out before reaching zero. The main element of a ride-
it-out approach is to rely on an automatic response of UI taxes 
through experience rating (and, in some states, automatic 
benefits reductions). Experience rating causes UI taxes to 
increase automatically when trust fund balances fall below 
designated thresholds. Column 8 of Table 1 identifies states 
with experience rating responses to the trust fund drawdowns 
caused by the 2001 recession.13
A second possible response is to “do something” legis-
latively. Usually this legislation features a combination of tax 
increases and benefits reductions. Panel A, column 9, shows 
Table 1




























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Panel A: States that have borrowed
California 1 0.51 0.09 -0.43 2004 0 0 Yes No No No
Illinois 5 0.42 -0.10 -0.52 2003 511 712 Yes 2003 Yes Yes
Massachusetts 13 0.55 0.02 -0.54 2004 0 0 Yes 2003 No No
Minnesota 15 0.50 -0.11 -0.61 2003 176 123 Yes 2003 No No
Missouri 19 0.36 -0.10 -0.46 2003 143 288 Yes 2004 Yes No
New York 2 0.16 -0.10 -0.26 2002 751 691 Yes No No No
North Carolinaa 12 0.69 -0.07 -0.76 2003 172 269 Yes No Yes Yes
Pennsylvania 6 0.58 0.15 -0.43 2004 0 0 Yes No No No
Texas 3 0.24 -0.19 -0.43 2002 1,400 1,167 No 2003 Yes Yes
Panel B: States with low reserves at end of 2003
Arkansas 33 0.42 0.09 -0.33 0 0 Yes 2003 No
Colorado 21 0.91 0.15 -0.76 0 0 Yes No
Connecticut 22 0.41 0.20 -0.21 0 0 Yes No
Michigan 9 0.59 0.24 -0.35 0 0 Yes No
Ohio 7 0.50 0.19 -0.31 0 0 Yes No
Virginia 11 0.84 0.17 -0.67 0 0 Yes 2003 No
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Workforce Security; information gathered by author. 
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that five states that have borrowed enacted solvency legislation 
in 2003 or 2004. (Important details of these legislative 
responses are given in Section 5.) Arkansas and Virginia also 
enacted legislation that included solvency provisions.
One possible element of a legislative response is to authorize 
and then to issue state debt instruments. This represents an 
alternative to using loans from the U.S. Treasury. To date, four 
states have authorized this form of borrowing, and Illinois, 
North Carolina, and Texas have issued state debt instruments. 
A principal argument for this financing strategy is that it is less 
costly because of the low interest rates on state-issued debt. 
Compared with loans from the Treasury under provisions 
specified by Title XII of the Social Security Act, state debt 
instruments may carry interest rates some 200 to 300 basis 
points or more below the interest rates on Title XII loans.
Section 6 discusses borrowing alternatives. It covers state 
bond issuances of earlier recessions as well as the issuances of 
2003 and 2004. The requirements on states and other details of 
Title XII loans are included in that discussion.
5. State Solvency Legislation 
of 2003-04
States have responded to their trust fund drawdowns in 
different ways. Column 9 of Table 1 identifies the states with 
low reserves where legislation was passed in 2003 or 2004 to 
improve solvency.14 Five with solvency legislation are states 
with some type of borrowing during 2002-04.
Table 2 focuses on the details of the solvency adjustments 
made by seven states where borrowing occurred between 
December 2002 and the end of 2004. Five states enacted some 
type of solvency package while North Carolina implemented an 
administrative response. Pennsylvania is also included in the 
table because it has automatic provisions that respond to trust 
fund drawdowns.15
The table identifies detailed aspects of benefits reductions, 
tax increases, and borrowing activities for the seven states. 
Four states (Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and 
Missouri) have included in their solvency packages several 
traditional provisions of benefits reductions and tax 
increases. The other three states have followed more unusual 
approaches to achieve improved solvency. We begin with 
Illinois and Pennsylvania.
In the late 1980s, Illinois and Pennsylvania modified their 
unemployment insurance statutes to implement a funding 
strategy that has been described as flexible financing. Unlike 
the traditional advance funding strategy, which relies on having 
a large fund balance prior to a recession, flexible financing 
deliberately aims to have a small fund balance, but then to 
activate automatic tax increases and benefits reductions to 
counteract a recession-related trust fund drawdown.
One can question the rationale for flexible financing. 
Household income and business profits both decline during 
recessions. Imposing added economic burdens on the parties 
during a recession, that is, reduced benefits and higher taxes, 
seems an inappropriate action to many. In addition to this 
objection, there is a second important question: Does flexible 
financing actually work? During the recession of 1990-92, 
Illinois and Pennsylvania did not experience important 
financing problems, as neither state is among the seven that 
secure loans to pay UI benefits.16 However, both states have 
experienced financing problems following the 2001 recession, 
hence their inclusion in Table 2.
The flexible financing provisions adopted by Illinois in the 
late 1980s included modifications of its tax-setting mechanism 
and provisions to freeze or reduce the maximum weekly benefit 
in response to a trust fund drawdown. Different triggers were 
established to activate individual solvency features. These 
included specific trust fund threshold amounts to trigger 
individual tax features along with the use of changes in tax rates 
and first-payment volume as well as a trust fund threshold to 
activate solvency-related benefits reductions. Other features of 
this legislation included a redefinition (reduction) in the 
weekly wage used to calculate maximum weekly benefits and 
the establishment of a floor for the state experience factor used 
to set the rate for the solvency tax. In reality, the latter two 
features were not flexibility features because they operated in 
all years after 1988. Nevertheless, this package was described as 
flexible financing by the then-director of the Illinois UI 
program,17 and it helped to justify a policy of maintaining a 
modest UI trust fund balance.
Pennsylvania’s UI law includes four flexible financing 
features. All four operate automatically as the level of a single 
solvency trigger—UI reserves on June 30 as a percentage of 
annualized benefits payments for the preceding thirty-six 
months—changes over seven designated ranges. The four 
features are: 1) a solvency surcharge on employers that can 
range from a minimum of -2.5 percent (a tax reduction) to a 
maximum increase of 7.2 percent of the basic UI tax liability, 
2) a flat-rate (additional) surcharge on employers of up to 
0.6 percent of taxable wages, 3) an employee tax of up to 
0.09 percent of total covered wages, and 4) a weekly benefits 
reduction of 2.3 percent. 
The solvency features were active during 2003 and 2004, and 
are slated to be in effect at least through 2005 and 2006. During 
2003, a solvency surcharge of 3.6 percent was in effect along 
with an employee tax of 0.02 percent. In 2004, the surcharge 
was 7.2 percent, the flat tax was 0.4 percent, and the employee 68 The Recession of 2001 and Unemployment Insurance Financing
tax was 0.09 percent. During 2005-06, all four features are 
projected to be operative at their respective maxima. Thus, 
Pennsylvania’s flexible financing strategy is being seriously 
tested. It will be of interest to note whether or not the four 
features will act with enough combined strength to restore the 
fund balance without the need for additional borrowing or the 
need for new solvency legislation. The entries in Table 2 for 
Pennsylvania refer to the activation of its automatic features 
during 2003-06.
Pennsylvania’s borrowing from the Motor License Fund 
had two motivations. First, and most obvious, the state wanted 
to ensure that its trust fund balance was adequate to make 
benefits payments during March-May without borrowing from 
the U.S. Treasury. Second, it wanted to ensure that some of its 
Reed Act moneys (included in the state’s UI trust fund balance) 
would remain available for future uses other than paying 
benefits.18
Unlike Pennsylvania, the other six states in Table 2, 
including Illinois, have all implemented some form of active 
initiative to address their UI funding problems. Five enacted 
new legislation while North Carolina responded adminis-
tratively. The North Carolina Council of State, a select 
committee of elected department heads such as the state 
treasurer and headed by the governor, authorized the issuance 
of tax-anticipation notes secured by future UI tax revenues. 
North Carolina issued $172 million of tax-anticipation notes 
in 2003 and fully repaid the notes with UI tax receipts from 
January to May 2004. During 2004, it again borrowed from the 
Table 2
Solvency Adjustments in Selected States
Illinois Massachusetts Minnesota Missouri North Carolina Pennsylvania Texas
Solvency legislation
    in 2003 or 2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Benefits reductions
    Monetary eligibility Ya X
    Replacement rate X X
    Maximum weekly benefit X X X,Y X
    Maximum duration X
    Waiting week X,Y
    Other reductions Xb Xc Xd
Increased taxes
    Solvency taxes X X Z X Z W
    Maximum rated employers X X X
    Tax schedule triggers X
    Taxable wage base X X X
Borrowing activities
    L o a n s  f r o m  U . S .  T r e a s u r y XXXXX X
    Bond/note authorization X X X X
    Bond/note issuance X X X
    Loan from state account X
Source: Information gathered by author.
Key: 
X = Benefits reduction, tax increase, or loan-related activity.
Y = Benefits increase.
Z = Increases in two solvency tax provisions in Minnesota and three provisions in Pennsylvania.
W = Reduction in solvency taxes.
aAlternative base period created, to become operative in 2008.
bIncreased penalties for fraud and overpayments, tightened eligibility for employees of temporary-help agencies.
cNew unemployment insurance benefit offsets against severance pay and vacation pay. 
dIncreased penalties for misconduct, new language for misconduct related to drug and alcohol abuse.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2005 69
U.S. Treasury, repaid the January-September Title XII loans at 
the end of September, and issued new tax-anticipation notes 
totaling $269 million during the September-December 2004 
period. These issuances will be repaid with UI tax receipts from 
the initial months of 2005.
Two aspects of North Carolina’s strategy are noteworthy. 
First, it is carefully adhering to the requirements for interest-
free borrowing under Title XII. Loans from the Treasury are 
repaid before September 30 and no new borrowing from the 
Treasury takes place between October 1 and December 31. 
Second, it is operating exclusively with short-term notes for its 
interest-bearing loans. Given the upward slope of the term 
structure of interest rates—the association between interest 
rates and the maturity date of debt instruments—this action 
ensures that the state will borrow at very low short-term rates, 
for example, about 1.1 percent for the notes issued in 2003 and 
1.8 percent for those issued in 2004.
Texas is the third state to follow a nonstandard approach to 
its UI financing problem. It entered the 2001 recession with 
one of the lowest reserve ratio multiples of all states (0.24, as 
shown in column 2 of Table 1), and it started to borrow in 
December 2002. By September 2003, its indebtedness totaled 
about $280 million. Late in the month, Texas authorized 
$2.0 billion in state bonds and issued a total of $1.4 billion in 
state debt instruments. These were issued as four separate 
series, differing in their tax status and call features. The bonds 
have maturity dates of between July 2004 and January 2009, but 
over half are callable so that they can be retired before maturity.
Part of the bond proceeds was used to repay all outstanding 
Title XII advances and the rest was deposited into the Texas UI 
trust fund. These actions allowed the state to avoid interest 
charges on its Title XII loans of roughly $17 million and a large 
UI tax surcharge that would have been due on January 1, 2004. 
The surcharge (deficit tax) would have totaled about 
$750 million and would have been levied on top of other UI 
taxes for 2004. The bond issuance allowed employers to pay 
much lower taxes in 2004 compared with their obligations 
under the earlier Texas tax statute.
Thus, while UI taxes paid in 2004 were higher than they 
were in 2003, they are much lower than would have been the 
case absent the bond issuance. By issuing bonds, Texas 
smoothed tax obligations and will spread repayment over five 
years. Texas also borrowed at a lower interest rate than the rate 
charged on Title XII advances. State officials estimate that more 
than $300 million in interest has been saved as a result. 
Additional details of the Texas bond issuance are discussed in 
Section 6.
The other four states in Table 2 enacted solvency legislation 
that included several traditional adjustments, that is, tax 
increases and benefits reductions. In all four states, tax 
increases accounted for most of the solvency adjustments.19 
All four states increased one or more aspects of solvency taxes 
triggered by low trust fund balances. Three of the four also 
increased their taxable wage base. Note that in Illinois and 
Missouri, benefits liberalizations as well as benefits reductions 
were part of the legislation.
Of the states with solvency tax increases, in Massachusetts 
the changes were especially noteworthy. In setting taxes for the 
upcoming year, Massachusetts examines the statewide reserve 
balance on August 31 and sets its solvency tax, assessed as a 
reduction in the employer’s trust fund account on the 
computation date, as a percentage of taxable wages. Legislation 
of December 2003 empowered the Department of Employment 
and Training to levy a solvency assessment that would cover 
not only traditional costs, such as noncharged benefits, but 
would also ensure that the state repays all outstanding Title XII 
loans secured before September 30 and collects enough 
additional revenue so as not to borrow between October 1 and 
December 31. In effect, this new authority ensures that 
Massachusetts will avoid interest charges on Title XII loans but 
adds uncertainty among employers liable for the solvency 
assessment in September. The new solvency provisions had 
their first test in 2004, but reserves were deemed sufficient to 
avoid an extra assessment of Title XII interest charges.
The solvency legislation in two of the four states, Illinois and 
Missouri, included authorizations to issue state notes/bonds. 
Illinois authorized $1.4 billion and issued bonds totaling 
$712 million on July 1, 2004. Missouri authorized $450 million 
in three-year notes, did not act in 2004, but has been examining 
options and could issue notes in 2005. (More details on state 
issuances are presented in Section 6.)
As noted in Table 2, solvency legislation in three states—
Illinois, Massachusetts, and Missouri—increased the UI 
taxable wage base. Massachusetts raised its base from $10,800 
per employee in 2003 to $14,000 in 2004, where it is slated to 
remain for ensuing years. Illinois and Missouri raised their tax 
bases in annual steps after 2004, to reach $12,300 and $12,500, 
respectively, in 2009, and possibly $13,000 for each state in 
2010. Minnesota, which already has an indexed taxable wage 
base, did not alter its tax base.
Chart 5 traces the taxable wage proportions for these four 
states from 1965 to 2010. The proportions through 2003 are 
based on historic data while the estimates for 2004-10 are based 
on regressions. The peaks in the sawtooth patterns identify 
years of major increases in the taxable wage base, including the 
federally mandated increases in 1972, 1978, and 1983.
Three aspects of Chart 5 are noteworthy. First, the 
proportions for the earliest years are substantially higher than 
they are for the latest years. Second, the pattern for Minnesota 
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adopted indexation in 1982; since then, the taxable wage 
proportion has varied within a narrow range of between 0.47 
and 0.50, while it has declined in the other three states. Third 
and most important are the generally small effects of the tax 
base increases after 2004. In Massachusetts, the taxable wage 
proportion changed much more between 1991 and 1992 
(increasing from 0.31 to 0.40) following the tax base increase of 
1992 than it did between 2003 and 2004 (from 0.28 to an 
estimated 0.33). The increases in Illinois after 2004 roughly 
match wage growth (assumed to be 3 percent per year), so the 
higher tax base from the new legislation does not substantially 
increase the taxable wage proportion. In all three states, the 
taxable wage proportion in 2010 is substantially lower than it 
was during the mid-1990s, despite recent legislation to raise the 
tax base.
6. State Borrowing Options
States with inadequate unemployment insurance reserves and 
the need for loans to pay benefits have two broad borrowing 
options: from the U.S. Treasury or from the private capital 
market. Throughout the history of UI, the majority of states 
have utilized advances from the U.S. Treasury under loan 
provisions specified in Title XII of the Social Security Act. 
During 1974-79, twenty-five separate programs borrowed 
from the Treasury, with loans totaling $5.54 billion. Between 
1980 and 1987, thirty-two different programs, including those 
of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, borrowed a total of 
$24.0 billion. More recently, seven states needed loans in the 
recession of the early 1990s and eight borrowed from the 
Treasury between December 2002 and December 2004. 
Roughly three-quarters of the programs have borrowed from 
the Treasury at some point. The terms of these loans are well 
understood and are briefly summarized below.20 In contrast, 
only six states have borrowed from the private capital market 
to finance trust fund deficits.
6.1 Borrowing from the U.S. Treasury
Short-term (cash-flow) borrowing from the Treasury does not 
carry interest charges when certain provisions are met. The 
most important of these are the full repayment by the end of 
September of all loans secured between January and 
September, and the absence of new borrowing during October-
December. As noted above, these loans help to maintain 
benefits payments in the early months of the year, when 
monthly outlays are highest but revenues are lowest.
Loans that last longer carry interest charges levied at an 
interest rate equal to the rate earned on positive fund balances, 
that is, the rate on longer term Treasury debt. In 2003-04, this 
rate was close to 6 percent. Interest is charged on the average 
daily balance of debt. States with funding problems manage 
their debts with the objective of ending each day with a UI trust 
fund balance of zero. Thus, either borrowing or debt 
repayment occurs each day, a strategy that minimizes the 
average daily balance.
Repayment of the principal on Treasury loans may come 
from the trust fund or from external sources. Repayment of 
interest, in contrast, must come from an external source. States 
are obligated to use their trust funds only to pay benefits, 
except for unusual circumstances such as trust fund moneys 
received from special Reed Act distributions. The principal can 
be repaid from the trust fund balance because the original debt 
was incurred to pay benefits.
Title XII also has provisions to ensure automatic repayment 
of outstanding debts. When the principal on a loan has been 
outstanding on January 1 of two consecutive years and remains 
unpaid as of November 1 of the second year, an automatic flat-
rate assessment on federal taxable wages is levied starting in 
January of the following year and continuing until the debt is 
fully repaid. The penalty rate starts at 0.3 percent and rises by 
increments of 0.3 percent or more during subsequent years.21 
Debts are repaid starting with the oldest. New York employers 
will pay this penalty tax in 2005.
When debt repayment takes place through increased federal 
taxes (reduced credit offsets), the taxes are paid at a single rate 
by all employers regardless of experience. The desire to avoid 
such flat-rate assessments was an important consideration of 
Illinois in using bond financing in 2004. The majority of the 
Chart 5
Taxable Wage Proportions for Four States
Actual (1965 to 2003) and Projected (2004 to 2010)
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Workforce Security
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state’s debt repayments will be from experience rated taxes, 
such as solvency taxes paid into the UI trust fund, and only a 
minority will be from flat-rate assessments to repay fixed-term 
bonds issued in July 2004.22
A final aspect of borrowing from the Treasury that is 
relevant today pertains to the disposition of moneys received 
by the states under the Reed Act, most recently the $8 billion 
disbursement of March 2002. As noted earlier, states can use 
these moneys to finance UI-ES administration and worker 
adjustment activities as well as to pay for benefits. However, 
any Reed Act moneys not specifically obligated for one of these 
“alternative” uses must be fully used up in paying benefits 
before a state can receive a Title XII loan. Pennsylvania’s 
borrowing from the Motor License Fund was undertaken to 
preserve some of its Reed Act moneys for alternative uses.
6.2 Borrowing from the Capital Market
Starting with Louisiana and West Virginia in 1987, six states 
have secured loans from the private capital market to cover 
unemployment insurance funding deficits. Table 3 gives some 
details of the loans. The first three states to utilize these loans 
have completed their repayments while the three that 
borrowed recently have only started theirs. In addition to the 
six states, Table 3 also includes Missouri, which has authorized 
this type of borrowing but had not yet issued debt instruments 
as of the end of December 2004.
Several uncertainties surround this form of borrowing, and 
they are reflected in the provisions of the debt issuances. 
Should the state economy perform worse than expected during 
the repayment period, there could be a need for additional 
borrowing. Note in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 that Louisiana 
and West Virginia borrowed their full authorizations, while 
Connecticut, Texas, and Illinois issued less than their full 
legislative authorizations. The latter arrangement allows for 
additional borrowing without the need for new legislation. 
Connecticut found that it did not need additional loans, but 
Texas and Illinois at present retain the authority to borrow 
some $600 to $700 million more should the need arise.
Column 4 shows a clear pattern in the loans—size is much 
smaller in the present decade than it was in the 1980s and 
1990s. Even if Missouri borrows its full authorization, the 
amount will represent only about 0.6 percent of covered wages. 
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State (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Recessions before 2001
Louisiana 1987 1,315 1,315 6.3 2002 Yes - 1,315 Yes  1994
West Virginia 1987 258 258 3.2 1993 Yes - 258 Yes  1991
Connecticut 1993 1,142 1,021 2.6 2001 Yes - 450 Yes - 571 Yes  Yes 2001
2001 recession
Texas 2003 2,000 1,400 0.5 2009 Yes - 800 Yes - 600 Yes Yes
North Carolina 2003 b 172b 0.2 b
2004 b 269b 0.2 b
Illinois 2004 1,400 712 0.4 2013 Yes - 340 Yes - 372 Yes Yes
Missouri 2004 450 c
Source: Information supplied to author by individual states. 
Note: Dollar amounts are in millions.
aLoan amount is expressed as a percentage of total state payroll of taxable covered employers in year of issuance.
bBorrowing authorized by administrative action. Amount determined on an “as-needed” basis. $172 million was borrowed in 2003; $269 million 
was borrowed in 2004. Notes were repaid in the year following their issuance, using unemployment insurance tax receipts.
cNothing issued as of January 2005.72 The Recession of 2001 and Unemployment Insurance Financing
For Louisiana in particular, it seems that the loan of 1987 was 
unnecessarily large. Its borrowing was fully repaid in seven 
years, not in the fifteen years potentially contemplated at 
issuance. Similarly, West Virginia fully repaid its loans in four 
years, not in the six years originally authorized.
Because of uncertainty about future macroeconomic 
performance and future interest rates, the bonds were issued 
with hedging features. As noted in column 8 of Table 3, all five 
bond issuances have had early redemption (call) provisions. 
Interest rate uncertainty is addressed by having variable-rate 
bonds in Connecticut, Texas, and Illinois, and potential future 
convertibility of variable-rate bonds to fixed-rate bonds in 
Connecticut, Texas, and Illinois. Connecticut both called and 
converted some of its bonds before repayment was completed 
in 2001.
North Carolina’s approach to uncertainty stands in sharp 
contrast to that of the states that have issued bonds. Rather 
than issue debt instruments with long maturities, the state (in 
2003 and 2004 at least) has borrowed using Title XII cash-flow 
loans as well as short-maturity notes and done so on an as-
needed basis. This strategy has the advantages of low interest 
rates associated with short-term notes and the absence of 
“overissuance” of state-supported debt instruments. A similar 
strategy was considered by Massachusetts in the early 1990s but 
was not implemented because its debt was successfully 
addressed by solvency legislation.
The Texas issuance of 2003 also involved considerations of 
the tax treatment of the bonds. Previous offerings by other 
states had utilized tax-free municipal bonds. However, Texas 
issued both tax-free and taxable bonds, $280 million and 
$1,120 million, respectively. The state’s strategy in having this 
mixture was influenced by the solvency tax feature of its UI law. 
Texas law requires the imposition of a solvency tax whenever 
its trust fund balance falls below 1 percent of taxable payrolls 
on the computation date, October 1. Any shortfall below this 
threshold is to be made up by solvency tax revenues in the 
upcoming year. Absent bond financing, the solvency taxes due 
in 2004 would have totaled about $1 billion. The tax-free 
component of the bond issuance was used to pay off the 
outstanding UI trust fund debt at the end of September 2003. 
An additional $1,120 million from taxable bonds was deposited 
into the trust fund, satisfying the 1 percent minimum balance 
requirement. 
To avoid losing interest income on its trust fund balance, 
Texas deposited the proceeds from taxable bonds into the trust 
fund. Thus, the state avoided imposing a large solvency tax. 
Because of the structure of bond market interest rates, Texas 
also realized a monetary gain from its financing package. 
Positive UI trust fund balances yielded about 6 percent per year 
in 2003 and 2004 while the interest rate on the state’s taxable 
bonds averaged less than 4 percent.23
For other states, the debt instruments have been exclusively 
tax-free bonds (notes in North Carolina). The proceeds have 
been used mainly to repay existing Title XII advances. How-
ever, small amounts have been reserved for administrative 
costs and for repaying possible future Title XII advances.
The typical time to issue state bonds has been July to 
September. Bond proceeds can be deposited into the trust fund 
prior to September 30 to satisfy Title XII cash-flow borrowing 
requirements. Also, since second-quarter tax receipts arrive 
during July-August, the bond issuance can be made in light of 
up-to-date information about the trust fund balance.
Some states have considered issuing bonds, but then 
concluded there were constitutional impediments. In 
Minnesota, for example, the state discussed the possibility; 
however, the state’s constitution is restrictive as to the activities 
that can be financed with general obligation bonds. The 
proceeds must be used to make improvements in public 
infrastructure or programs. Allowable activities are 
identified—such as building classrooms for schools and 
upgrading parks—but financing UI trust fund deficits is not an 
allowable activity. The state can also borrow for the short term, 
but short-term loans must be fully repaid before the end of the 
same biennium. In the fall of 2003, this requirement implied 
full repayment by the end of June 2005. Because UI taxes were 
already slated to increase during 2004-05 through experience 
rating, there was little appeal in adding to employer taxes in 
these two years to repay state-issued notes. In sum, issuing 
bonds was not allowed and issuing notes was not an attractive 
option.
States issuing bonds establish an administrative apparatus 
to collect the taxes needed to repay principal and interest on the 
bonds and to cover associated administrative expenses. If the 
administrative entity judges it appropriate, “excess” revenues 
are used to repay parts of the callable bonds. This 
administrative entity also transfers moneys into the UI trust 
fund to prevent the accrual of new interest-bearing Title XII 
advances.
7.B o r r o w i n g  C o s t s
Except for Title XII cash-flow loans, all forms of borrowing 
entail costs. For a state trying to minimize unemployment 
insurance borrowing costs, the basic contrast between Title XII 
advances and other forms of borrowing is straightforward. 
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executed on a daily basis, a state can minimize the average daily 
balance of its outstanding loans through appropriate debt 
management. It simply retires debt on days when revenues 
exceed benefits payments and borrows on days when payments 
exceed revenues. Thus, the cost of borrowing under Title XII is 
calculated as this minimum average daily balance times the 
Title XII interest rate. Interest costs accrue as long as there is 
outstanding debt and there are no other borrowing costs.
The Title XII interest rate is set annually by the U.S. 
Treasury and is capped at 10 percent. In the six years between 
1982 and 1987, the rate consistently exceeded 9 percent and 
equaled 10 percent in three of these years. Column 1 of Table 4 
displays Title XII interest rates from 1991 to 2004. The highest 
rate during these fourteen years was 8.60 percent in 1991. Rates 
have been below 7 percent since 1994 and below 6 percent 
during 2003 and 2004. With the low inflation of recent years, 
this and other interest rates have been trending downward.
Borrowing from the private bond market involves several 
considerations, two of which are the type of debt to issue and 
the size of the issuance. Compared with Title XII loans, this 
form of borrowing will almost certainly carry a lower interest 
rate, but the amount of borrowing will exceed the average daily 
balance of Title XII loans. Also, costs other than interest rate 
costs must be considered.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 present, respectively, interest 
rates for taxable corporate bonds and for tax-free municipal 
bonds (the type of instruments issued by most state UI 
programs that have borrowed from the private bond market). 
Interest rates are lower for the latter type of instrument because 
the interest paid to owners of such bonds is not subject to 
federal and state income taxes. The low interest rates on 
municipal bonds vis-à-vis other bonds are highlighted in 
columns 8 and 9, which show spreads between municipal 
bonds, on the one hand, and Title XII loans and corporate 
bonds, respectively.
Two other points should also be noted. First, the interest 
rates in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 are average yields, averaged 
across bonds of differing maturities. Newly issued bonds can 
Table 4
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Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1990 8.70 9.32 7.25 8.26 NA 7.75 NA 145 207 NA NA
1991 8.60 8.77 6.89 6.82 4.69 5.54 NA 171 188 220 391
1992 8.05 8.14 6.41 5.30 3.02 3.51 NA 164 173 339 503
1993 7.45 7.22 5.63 4.44 2.52 3.07 NA 182 159 311 493
1994 6.90 7.97 6.19 6.27 3.53 4.37 NA 71 178 266 337
1995 6.83 7.59 5.95 6.25 3.98 5.66 NA 88 164 197 285
1996 6.71 7.37 5.75 5.99 3.62 5.15 NA 96 162 213 309
1997 6.71 7.27 5.55 6.10 3.72 5.20 5.57 116 172 183 299
1998 6.51 6.53 5.12 5.14 3.48 4.91 5.40 139 141 164 303
1999 6.45 7.05 5.43 5.49 3.46 4.78 5.09 102 162 197 299
2000 6.45 7.62 5.77 6.22 4.30 6.00 6.27 68 185 147 215
2001 6.42 7.08 5.19 4.09 2.76 3.48 3.78 123 189 243 366
2002 6.27 6.49 5.05 3.10 1.64 1.64 1.67 122 144 341 463
2003 6.08 5.66 4.75 2.10 1.05 1.03 1.11 133 91 370 503
2004 5.98 5.63 4.68 2.78 1.42 1.40 1.38 130 95 326 456
Sources: Economic Report of the President (Table B-73, January 2004); Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (<http://www.stlouisfed.org/>).
Notes: Data for all years are annual averages except for Title XII loans in 1997-99, which refer to the fourth quarter. Each percentage point 
of an interest rate equals 100 basis points. NA: Data not available.74 The Recession of 2001 and Unemployment Insurance Financing
carry interest rates that depart substantially from these 
averages. State UI programs issuing municipal bonds in 2003-
04 have paid interest rates in the 2.0 to 4.0 percent range. The 
large contrasts with Title XII interest rates make this form of 
borrowing attractive for a debtor state. Second, the interest rate 
spreads in columns 8 and 9 exhibit considerable year-to-year 
variability. In both columns, the widest spread is more than 
twice the size of the smallest spread. The municipal bond 
differential with Title XII, shown in column 8, has not been 
constant.
Columns 4-7 of Table 4 display interest rates for debt 
instruments of successively shorter maturities. In general, rates 
decrease at shorter maturities, and municipals carry lower rates 
than do other instruments. Interest rates at the short end of the 
market have been very low since the onset of the recession in 
2001, with spreads vis-à-vis Title XII loans, corporate bonds, 
and municipal bonds typically exceeding 300 basis points 
(columns 10 and 11).
One purpose in showing several interest rate series in 
Table 4 is to suggest something of the range of debt instru-
ments that a state might consider when borrowing from the 
private bond market. As indicated above, North Carolina 
issued notes in 2003 and 2004. During 2002-04, interest rates 
on obligations of one year and less (columns 5-7) have 
consistently fallen below 2 percent.
Besides interest costs, at least three other costs of issuing 
private debt instruments should be noted. First, underwriting 
fees are charged by the companies that issue bonds. These fees 
are assessed at the time of the issuance. Second, insurance and 
other issuance costs must be recognized. Bonds have to be 
insured against default risk, and other incidental costs also 
arise. Third, exercising the call features of municipal bonds 
involves a fee in that the principal must be redeemed at a price 
above the face value of the bond. Some examples of these costs 
based on past bond issuances are instructive.
For the bond sales made by Louisiana, Connecticut, and 
Illinois, underwriting discounts (fees) ranged from 0.22 to 
0.34 percent of the loan amounts while insurance and other 
issuance costs ranged from 0.23 to 0.56 percent of the loan 
amounts. For these three states, the total of all issuance costs 
ranged from 0.48 to 0.89 percent of the loans. Although 
analogous detailed information for Texas has not been found, 
the sum of all issuance costs was about 0.33 percent. Expressed 
as an annual percentage interest rate prorated over the lives of 
the associated borrowings, the sum of these costs would 
represent less than 0.2 percent.
Early redemption premiums for callable bonds were 
generally between 1 and 3 percent for Louisiana, Connecticut, 
and Illinois. Calls exercised three years after issuance would 
amount to an annualized percentage of less than 1 percent in 
nearly all instances and less than 0.5 percent for a call exercised 
after six years.
The sum of all of the “additional” cost components 
delineated above can be combined and expressed as a number 
of basis points to be added to the interest rate costs of debt 
issuance in the private market. The preceding discussion 
suggests that the increment would be equivalent to between 
25 and 75 basis points. In financial markets, where the spread 
between Title XII interest rates and municipal bonds has 
generally exceeded 100 basis points (Table 4, column 8), these 
additional costs still imply a lower overall interest rate from 
issuing municipal bonds. The interest rate cost advantage is, of 
course, even larger when the comparison involves short-term 
debt instruments (columns 10 and 11 of Table 4).
In summary, a generic comparison of Title XII borrowing 
versus borrowing in the bond market leads to three 
conclusions. First, the principal upon which interest is charged 
is always lower for Title XII loans. Second, the effective interest 
rate under a bond issuance (including the added costs just 
discussed) is lower than the Title XII interest rate. Third, the 
difference in costs under the two forms of borrowing is 
ambiguous. However, as the interest differential in favor of 
private debt instruments becomes larger, it is increasingly likely 
that this will be the less expensive of the two options.
In earlier work assessing the comparative costs of Title XII 
loans and municipal bonds for Louisiana and West Virginia, 
we conclude that the costs of municipal bond issuance are not 
clearly lower for either of these two states.24 Obviously, as the 
spread between Title XII interest rates and other interest rates 
becomes larger, it is more likely that borrowing from the 
private bond market will lead to cost savings vis-à-vis using 
Title XII loans. It also seems likely that the largest savings will 
be realized, at least in the current financial environment, when 
a state borrows by issuing short-term debt instruments with 
their very low interest rates (Table 4).
8. UI Programs after Bond Issuances
Does issuing bonds have effects on subsequent unemployment 
insurance program performance? Because only three states 
have fully repaid the loans secured from “bonding,” the range 
of experiences to date is very limited. This section examines 
two aspects of post-bonding performance: trust fund 
accumulations and benefits payments. The latter considers 
both the recipiency rate (beneficiaries as a share of statewide 
unemployment) and the replacement rate (weekly benefits as a 
proportion of weekly wages). The discussion focuses on 1979 to 
2004 and places heavy emphasis on charts to make key points.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2005 75
Chart 7
Recipiency Rates and Replacement Rates 
for States Issuing Bonds
1979 to 2003
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Workforce Security and
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: Recipiency rates are calculated as the ratio of unemployment
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Chart 6 displays reserve ratio multiples for Louisiana, 
Connecticut, and West Virginia. Recall that Louisiana and 
West Virginia issued bonds in 1987 and Connecticut did so in 
1993. Recall also that a reserve ratio multiple of 1.0 is frequently 
used as a measure of trust fund solvency. Reserves underlying 
Chart 6 are measured as the total balances held at the U.S. 
Treasury, and outstanding balances owed in the private bond 
market are not subtracted. Thus, while these debts were still 
outstanding, the multiples shown in Chart 6 overstate the net 
solvency position of the three states.25
In all three states, the bond issuance had a large effect on the 
state’s trust fund balance. For both Louisiana and West 
Virginia, the reserve ratio multiple at the end of 1987 was 
higher by about 1.0 than it was one year earlier. The increase for 
Connecticut between 1992 and 1993 was about 0.5.26
As the three states were repaying their bonds, they were also 
increasing reserves in their U.S. Treasury balances. The reserve 
ratio multiple for Louisiana increased steadily throughout the 
decade after bonds were issued. The multiple first reached 1.0 
at the end of 1995 and has remained above 1.0 through 2004. 
For West Virginia and Connecticut, the multiples peaked at 
about 0.5 and have never substantially exceeded this level.
All three states have had quite favorable trust fund 
experiences during and after the recession of 2001. Between 
December 2000 and December 2003, the national reserve ratio 
multiple decreased by 0.41, from 0.66 to 0.25. The analogous 
decreases for Connecticut, Louisiana, and West Virginia, 
however, were 0.21, 0.10, and 0.05, respectively. All eight states 
with Title XII loans in the current recession (Table 1, panel A) 
had larger decreases in their multiples, and all but New York 
had decreases that exceeded the national average of 0.41. Given 
their low initial reserve ratio multiples entering the recession, 
Connecticut and West Virginia were fortunate to have 
experienced small decreases in their multiples during 2001-04.
States with UI trust fund solvency problems have 
traditionally responded with policies that both increase taxes 
and reduce UI benefits. Each of these three states followed this 
route. Chart 7 traces four series over the 1979-2003 period 
showing recipiency rates and replacement rates. Recipiency in 
Louisiana and West Virginia decreased after 1986, by 10 and 
9 percentage points, respectively.27 Louisiana’s and 
Connecticut’s replacement rates both decreased substantially 
in the years following bonding. Specific policy changes that 
contributed to the changes in replacement rates included 
moving to a two-high-quarter procedure for calculating weekly 
benefits in Connecticut, and both reducing and freezing the 
weekly benefit maximum in Louisiana.
Finally, note in Chart 7 that the benefits series increased 
between 2000 and 2003. Although an explanation of the 
cause(s) of these recent changes is beyond the scope of this 
paper, a likely reason is a shift in the mix of claimants toward 
high-wage and experienced workers. When we consider 
Chart 6 along with Chart 7, it appears that the improvement 
in Louisiana’s trust fund reserve position after 1987 is 
substantially due to benefits restrictions that have reduced both 
the recipiency rate and the replacement rate.
In sum, for the three states where the processes of issuing 
and repaying municipal bonds have been completed, only 
Louisiana subsequently built a large reserve that meets the 
Chart 6
Reserve Ratio Multiples for States Issuing Bonds
1979 to 2004
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Workforce Security.
Notes: The line captions identify the year when the state issued
municipal bonds. Reserves refer only to gross amounts held at,
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common UI actuarial standard of a reserve ratio multiple of 
1.0. The fact that the other two states have not experienced 
financing problems following the 2001 recession has more to 
do with favorable economic developments than with having 
large prerecession trust fund reserves. In two of these three 
states, issuing bonds was not followed by policies to build trust 
fund balances to levels widely viewed as prudent.
9.C o n c l u s i o n
Our examination of state experiences with funding problems 
after the 2001 recession leads to six key observations.
First, the states have undergone a variety of experiences 
associated with the size of their trust fund drawdowns and the 
types of loans used to address their funding problems. As of 
January 2005, the full set of state experiences even includes 
inaction by both California and New York. Their actions 
remain to be determined.
Second, there are no real surprises in the identities of the 
nine states that have had to borrow. As shown in panel A of 
Table 1, all had low trust fund balances at the end of December 
2000, just before the onset of the 2001 recession. Only North 
Carolina had a reserve ratio multiple above 0.60 on that date. 
Table 1 also shows that the funding problems have been 
concentrated among the large states.
Third, the states fully understand how Title XII cash-flow 
loans operate. Several state borrowing and repayment actions 
have been timed to avoid interest charges on Title XII loans, 
for example, by ensuring that full repayment occurs before 
September 30 and that no new borrowing takes place during 
October-December. Furthermore, Massachusetts and 
Pennsylvania have undertaken other actions linked to Title XII 
borrowing requirements. Under legislation of 2003, 
Massachusetts can avoid borrowing during October-December 
by levying a solvency assessment imposed in September. 
During March-May 2004, Pennsylvania borrowed from 
another state fund to preserve access to Reed Act moneys in its 
unemployment insurance trust fund to be used for improving 
UI program administration.
Fourth, when comparing the costs of borrowing under 
Title XII with those of borrowing from the private bond 
market, we see that the former consistently involves a smaller 
principal on outstanding debt while the latter consistently has 
a lower interest rate, even recognizing underwriting fees, 
insurance, and other issuance costs and early-redemption 
premiums. Thus, to compare costs, one must recognize the 
average amount of outstanding loans as well as the interest 
rates on the loans. As the interest rate spread between Title XII 
loans and private debt instruments becomes larger, it is 
increasingly likely that the latter will carry lower total 
borrowing costs for a state.
Fifth, if a state explores the private securities market, it is 
important to consider the full range of maturities within this 
market. For a state to minimize interest costs, it may be less 
expensive to borrow in the very short end of this market from 
late September to the end of December, to repay this debt in the 
early months of the following year, and to rely on Title XII 
loans from January to late September of the next year. This is 
the strategy currently followed by North Carolina.
Sixth, there are already signs that the recovery of state UI 
trust fund balances back toward high levels may be slow. 
Examples of state legislative actions that explicitly offset the 
normal operations of experience rating can already be found, 
such as Idaho’s tax reductions of 2005. If widespread actions 
prevent higher UI tax rate schedules from becoming operative 
in 2006 and later years, an anemic pace of trust fund recovery 
can be anticipated. The slow accumulation of reserves during 
the 1990s (recall the reserve ratios presented in Chart 4) 
occurred upon a much higher initial reserve ratio than that of 
the current recovery (1.25 percent of payrolls in 1993, 
compared with 0.51 percent at the end of 2004). If reserves are 
not rebuilt, borrowing by state UI programs during the next 
recession will be much larger than the borrowing observed 
during the recession of 2001.Endnotes
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1. Regular UI pays up to twenty-six weeks of benefits in all states 
except Massachusetts and Washington, where the limit is thirty weeks, 
and Montana, where the limit is twenty-eight weeks. It is the main 
program for compensating the unemployed and is financed by 
employer payroll contributions. 
2. The balances at the end of 2003 and 2004 are net balances that net 
out about $3.2 billion in U.S. Treasury and bond market loans 
outstanding at the end of both years. 
3. The periods are 1970-72, 1974-76, 1980-83, 1991-92, and 2001-03, 
with the recessions of 1980 and 1982 treated as a single extended 
episode. The reductions in reserve ratios during these five periods 
were 1.05 percent, 2.00 percent, 1.38 percent, 0.63 percent, and 
0.90 percent, respectively.
4. This downward trend has been present since the mid-1940s.
5. New York State offers a good illustration of the change. At the end 
of 1989, the state’s reserve balance was $3.2 billion and the reserve 
ratio was 1.89 percent. The corresponding figures at the end of 2000 
were $1.2 billion and 0.41 percent. Reserve adequacy in 2000 was less 
than one-fourth of adequacy in 1989.
6. The national reserve ratio at the end of 2000 was 1.46 percent while 
the national high-cost rate was 2.22 percent (costs during the twelve 
months of calendar year 1975), yielding a reserve ratio multiple of 
0.66. 
7. Of course, policies to restrict tax increases during the recovery 
could offset the replenishment of trust fund balances. Experiences 
from the 1990s show that this is a real possibility.
8. Automatic adjustments to UI trust fund drawdowns occur as states 
move to tax schedules with higher rates, individual employers move to 
higher tax rates because of worsened experience (lower reserve ratios 
or higher benefit ratios), and solvency taxes increase. Additionally, 
about ten states also have provisions to reduce benefits automatically 
when trust fund balances are depleted. 
9. The size indicator is total payroll of taxable employers in 2002.
10. The median size rank of the fifty-three programs is twenty-seven. 
Arkansas ranks thirty-third.
11. Reserves for North Carolina at the end of 2000 included 
$200 million in the state’s reserve fund.
12. Three states in Table 1—North Carolina, Colorado, and 
Virginia—were among the top four in the decrease in their reserve 
ratio multiple, as shown in column 4. Only the Virgin Islands had a 
larger decrease. 
13. Two types of ride-it-out responses can be identified. The first is a 
traditional experience rating response in which the automatic 
response of UI taxes restores the trust fund. To follow this, a state must 
have a large prerecession reserve, hence our emphasis in the earlier 
discussion on the reserve ratio multiple of 1.0. The second is a flexible 
financing response, which causes taxes to be increased and/or benefits 
to be reduced as the fund balance decreases. In the past, Illinois and 
Pennsylvania have advocated flexible financing.
14. Additionally, North Carolina has undertaken administrative 
actions to compensate for inadequate reserves.
15. The two states with borrowing but no response to date, New York 
and California, are not included in Table 2 because there is no 
legislative or other action to describe.
16. The seven states are Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, and New York. Of these, only 
Connecticut and Massachusetts had loans during 1990-94 that totaled 
more than 1 percent of (1991) payroll. Note that the District of 
Columbia is referred to as a “state” because its UI program has benefit 
and financing features similar to those of other state UI programs.
17. One description of the Illinois legislation is found in a statement 
by Sally Ward, head of the unemployment insurance agency in 1987 
(see U.S. House [1987]).  
18. Should an unexpected drawdown have occurred during March-
May that caused the fund balance to reach zero, all moneys in the trust 
fund would have had to be used to pay benefits. 
19. In Pennsylvania, the breakdown was roughly 58 percent for 
employer tax increases, 33 percent for employee taxes, and 9 percent 
for benefits reductions over the four years from 2003 to 2006. In 
Illinois, the breakdown was 92 percent for employer tax increases and 
8 percent for benefits reductions. In Massachusetts, nearly 100 percent 
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Endnotes (Continued)
20. Summaries of this method of borrowing are found in Vroman 
(1990) and McHugh (2004). 
21. Technically, this tax increase is a reduction of the credit that states 
are allowed to take on their federal UI taxes when their experience 
rating system (the method for assigning contribution rates to 
individual employers) is deemed acceptable by the federal partner, 
and other federal requirements are satisfied.
22. This statement reflects anticipated repayment patterns in Illinois, 
where callable bonds will be repaid several years before present 
maturity dates as solvency and other tax receipts replenish the UI trust 
fund.
23. Placing tax-free bonds into the trust fund would have meant 
that the associated interest income was subject to the Treasury 
Department’s interest arbitrage rules. Essentially, the interest rate 
spread between UI trust fund balances and the tax-free bonds would 
have to be repaid to the Treasury. Since $600 million of the Texas 
bonds carry variable interest rates, the net interest income on the UI 
trust fund balance to be realized in later years is uncertain, dependent 
on future variation in the relevant interest rates. 
24. See Vroman (1998). 
25. Repayment was completed in West Virginia in 1991, in Louisiana 
in 1994, and in Connecticut in 2001. 
26. Note, incidentally, that Connecticut also had a large deficit at the 
end of the 1970s. In fact, it had Title XII loans outstanding 
continuously between 1972 and 1984. 
27. In Louisiana, the average recipiency rates during 1979-86 and 
1988-95 were 0.294 and 0.187, respectively. The corresponding 
averages in West Virginia were 0.307 and 0.214.References
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